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More and more, elections around the world seem to be won or lost on the basis of 
the candidates’ personal qualities rather than their policies. Despite its prevalence and 
consequences, we still know very little about what explains such candidate-centered 
voting, particularly in new democratic contexts. I argue that variation in candidate-
centered voting is largely a function of political sophistication: voters with higher levels 
of political sophistication are better able to process information relating to policy and 
performance, which tends to be more cognitively demanding than information relating to 
candidate’s personalities. To test this argument, I estimate models of vote choice and 
electoral utility using survey data from the 2002 presidential election in Brazil. The 
results largely support my contention that political sophistication conditions the weight of 
candidate considerations relative to policy and performance considerations.   
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More and more, elections around the world seem to be won or lost on the basis of 
the candidates’ personal qualities rather than their policies.  Such candidate-centered 
voting has long characterized elections in the United States and other established 
democracies.  Now it appears to be characterizing elections in newer democracies as 
well.  This is a matter of concern for the quality and the stability of democratic 
governance. 
Despite its prevalence and consequences, we still know very little about what 
explains candidate-centered voting, particularly in new democratic contexts.  I argue that 
variation in candidate-centered voting is largely a function of political sophistication: 
voters with higher levels of political sophistication are better able to process information 
relating to policy and performance, which tends to be more cognitively demanding than 
information relating to candidate’s personalities. 
This contention is not new.  Political sophistication stands front and center in 
many existing studies that examine variation in the extent of candidate-centered voting.1  
The empirical support for political sophistication’s conditioning role, however, is mixed.2  
Many studies find no evidence of such a conditioning effect (Glass 1985; Miller et al. 
1986; Rahn et al. 1990; Pierce 1993; Sniderman et al. 1991) while others do (Luskin and 
Globetti 2002; Iyengar et al. 2007; Lavine and Gschwend 2006). 
Whether the extent of candidate-centered voting is a function of political 
sophistication thus remains an open question.  This study will move our understanding of 
                                                
1 Note that studies differ in their terminology for and measures of political sophistication, but all refer to 
the same underlying concept. 
2 See Luskin and Globetti (2002) for an extended discussion of potential explanations as to why these 
studies have reached such varied conclusions. 
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this issue forward in at least two respects.  First, I focus on the weight of candidate 
considerations relative to policy and performance considerations, which is likely to 
depend on political sophistication, rather than on the absolute weight of candidate 
considerations, which is not.  Most existing work has focused on the question of why 
candidate considerations matter so much in an absolute sense.  But this, I shall argue, is 
the wrong question.  The right question is why policy and performance considerations 
matter so little relative to candidate considerations. 
Second, I examine the issue in a new electoral context.  Nearly all the existing 
studies limit their empirical focus to U.S. presidential elections in the 1980s.  I test my 
argument using survey data from the 2002 Brazilian presidential election.  This electoral 
context is an interesting one in which to examine this question for at least two reasons.  
Because Brazil has a relatively weak party system, we can explore the relationship 
between political sophistication and candidate-centered voting in a context where party 
identification does not dominate vote choice or complicate the effects of other factors.  
Moreover, the 2002 presidential election is a noteworthy election in both the Brazilian 
and Latin American political contexts more generally.  Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s 
victory was one of the first in the wave of leftist electoral victories that has recently swept 
across Latin America.  While his election was popularly interpreted as a mandate to 
govern from the left (see Baker et al. 2006; Hunter and Power 2007), Lula’s personal 
appeal was crucial to his victory (see Hunter and Power 2007). 
This report is organized as follows.  After a discussion of why candidate-centered 
voting raises concerns for the quality of democracy, I present the reasoning behind my 
argument regarding political sophistication’s conditioning role. The next two chapters 
introduce the models and data employed in the analysis of Brazilians’ electoral decisions 
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in 2002, followed by a presentation of the estimation results.  The final chapter 
summarizes and concludes. 
 4 
Chapter 2 
Candidate-Centered Voting and Democracy 
Voters may take a variety of considerations into account when evaluating 
candidates and making electoral decisions.  Considerations are the reasons (beliefs, 
attitudes, perceptions, and values) guiding voters’ electoral decisions, whatever they may 
be.3  Policy considerations relate to candidates’ policies.  Performance considerations 
relate to candidates’ or their party’s record in office.  Candidate considerations relate to 
candidates’ personal traits and demeanor, which together form candidate images (Rahn et 
al. 1990; Luskin and Globetti 2002).  Most voters probably take considerations of more 
than one type into account in their electoral decisions; the question is one of degree, both 
in an absolute sense and relative to other considerations.  To the extent that candidate 
considerations dominate policy and performance ones, voters engage in candidate-
centered voting. 
Candidate-centered voting has long been of concern in established democracies 
and is of growing concern in Third Wave democracies.  As early as The American Voter 
(Cambpell et al. 1960), the voting behavior literature recognized candidate considerations 
as important factors in vote choice.  Subsequent research has continued to highlight the 
importance of these considerations in both the United States (see Bartels 2002) and other 
established democracies, like Great Britain, France, and Canada (see King 2002). 
Despite speculation that they have become increasingly ideological, Latin 
American elections look similar. Studies throughout the region have found that candidate 
considerations – rather than ideology or issues – often stand out as the strongest 
predictors of vote choice. For example, Mexican voters weighed candidates’ competence 
                                                
3 The term “considerations” is borrowed from Zaller (1992); note, however, that his usage of the term is 
more general, not limited to reasons for vote decisions. 
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more than their policy stands in evaluating the presidential candidates in both 2000 
(Zechmeister 2003) and 2006 (Greene 2009).  And, as I show below, candidate 
personality is one of the most important factors informing Brazilians’ vote choices (see 
also Silveira 1998). 
The neglect of policies and performance in favor of candidate images poses 
problems for the quality and functioning of democracy.  Candidate-centered voting 
undermines the potential for democratic representation, defined roughly as the 
correspondence between the policies citizens want and the policies they get.  
Representation should be enhanced to the extent that voters focus on policy and 
weakened to the extent that they focus on anything else.  Candidate images are largely 
policy-irrelevant, making candidate-centered voting a distraction from the type of voting 
that would serve representation. 
Candidate-centered voting also weakens democratic accountability.  Punishing 
leaders and political parties for performing poorly in office requires attending to what 
they do and incorporating this information into subsequent evaluations.  While candidate 
images may be more performance- than policy-relevant, they are still a weak and 
unreliable proxy.  In this light, too, they are largely a distraction, an impediment to 
holding parties and officials accountable. 
There have been real reasons to question the extent of representation and 
accountability in Latin American democracies over the past two decades.  Indeed, these 
concerns have motivated much research on representation in the region (e.g., Hagopian 
1998; Stokes 2001; Luna and Zechmeister 2005).  They even led O’Donnell (1993) to 
introduce a new term to refer to many Latin American democracies; rather than 
representative democracies, many of region’s democracies are best described, he argues, 
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as “delegative democracies” in which “whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby 
entitled to govern as he or she sees fit” (59). 
Neglected in most of this research, however, has been consideration of the role 
played by voters in fostering democratic representation.  If elites’ democratic 
responsibility is to govern in a way consistent with the electorate’s mandate, it is voters’ 
responsibility to provide such a mandate.  Doing so requires that voters base their 
electoral decisions on substantive criteria like candidates’ policy and performance.  To 
the extent that these types of criteria are outweighed by distractions like candidates’ 
personalities, the potential for democratic representation is weakened. 
While candidate-centered voting poses problems for democracy in any context, it 
can be particularly detrimental in newly democratic ones where political institutions tend 
to be under-developed, limiting horizontal mechanisms of accountability.  Recent history 
shows how easily leaders whose power rests in their personal appeal among the masses 
can chip away at democratic institutions and blur the line between democratic and 
authoritarian rule.  Salient examples include leaders like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and 
Vladimir Putin in Russia who won election (and re-election) thanks in large part to their 
personal appeal among voters. 
Why do candidates’ personal qualities so often dominate voters’ electoral 
decisions?  I argue that candidate-centered voting is largely an information problem.  
Voters may lack the ability to process information relating to policy and performance, 
which tends to be more cognitively demanding than information relating to candidate’s 
personalities.  I develop this argument in the following section. 
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Chapter 3 
Political Sophistication’s Conditioning Role 
Voters are bombarded with information during election campaigns. Nobody can 
notice, interpret, and store it all. We all have cognitive limits – a fact that has underlain 
decades of research on information processing in social and political psychology. Voters 
use schemata – pre‐existing cognitive structures, consisting of phenomenal objects and 
cognitive connections between them – to process new information. Schemata affect what 
information gets processed, how it is organized and stored in memory, and when and how 
it may be retrieved (Fiske and Linville 1980; Lau and Sears 1986; Conover and Feldman 
1984). Schemata may be more or less developed. Borrowing from Luskin’s (1987) 
definition of political sophistication, a schema is more or less developed depending on its 
size, breadth, and interconnectedness. 
The development of schemata determines the reception of new information and 
use of the stored information they contain. Reception refers to the process of noticing, 
interpreting, and storing new information.4  Note that reception is distinct from exposure. 
People exposed to the same message may receive different amounts and types of 
information depending on the relevance, development, and accessibility of their existing 
schemata. Use refers to the process retrieving stored information to evaluate an object 
(e.g., forming an opinion on an issue or to evaluating a candidate). The extent to which a 
schema is developed determines whether and how much information relating to that 
schema is available for use in these evaluations. 
It is important to note that the cognitions stored in political schemata are not 
limited to raw bits of political information. As people process more and more information 
                                                
4   The term reception is borrowed from Zaller (1992). 
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and their political schemata become more developed, they make more connections 
between how the raw information they receive relates to their predispositions. These 
connections – and any subsequent subjective assessments related to them – are 
themselves cognitions in schemata. 
A person’s political belief system contains all his or her politically relevant 
schemata (Converse 1964). The belief‐system‐level version of schema development is 
political sophistication (Luskin 1987). In other words, to the extent that a person’s 
political belief system is developed, he or she is more or less politically sophisticated. 
Most voters follow politics quite distantly if at all, and their political belief 
systems tend to be poorly developed. This has at least two important (and related) 
implications for the question at hand. First, these less sophisticated voters encounter new 
information without having previously thought much about politics and probably without 
many developed political opinions. Second, such voters cannot receive much of the 
political information in election campaigns, even if exposed to it. Equipped with better 
developed political belief systems, the more politically sophisticated will tend to have 
political opinions and be better able to manage the new information as they encounter it. 
Because they are more likely to receive policy‐ and performance‐relevant information, 
they are more likely to use it to evaluate candidates. Accordingly, the absolute weights of 
both policy and performance considerations should increase in magnitude as political 
sophistication increases. 
This is especially true of policy considerations. In order to vote on the basis of a 
policy, voters need to be able to identify their own positions in light of their interests and 
to identify the candidates’ positions on the relevant issue. Previous research shows that 
voters have a difficult time identifying candidates’ policy positions and that this 
undermines the influence of policy considerations in electoral decisions (Alvarez et al. 
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1994; Peterson 2005.). While not often (if ever) acknowledged in the issue‐voting 
literature, many voters’ also have difficulty identifying their own positions on issues, and 
this too undermines the influence of policy considerations. As political sophistication 
increases, however, voters are better able to process policy‐relevant information and 
better able to identify both their own and candidates’ policy positions. 
Performance considerations are less cognitively demanding than policy 
considerations. Voters need only know who (or which party) has been in office, what 
they think of his, her, or its performance, and how this information relates to the current 
candidates. While such “retrospective voting” is often portrayed as a simple exercise that 
even uninformed voters can do (Fiorina 1978), it is not always so simple. Performance 
considerations require some understanding the political environment, actors, and 
developments. 
Furthermore, it can often be difficult to determine how performance‐relevant 
information relates to current candidates. This is particularly true in contexts lacking 
strong party systems where electoral competition tends to be volatile from election to 
election (this point that will be addressed in more depth below). Thus, while I expect 
political sophistication’s conditioning effect to be more pronounced for policy 
considerations than performance considerations, more politically sophisticated voters 
should still be better able to process performance‐relevant information and use it in 
evaluating candidates. 
Unlike policy and performance, candidate considerations require little (if any) 
cognitive effort. As a result, political sophistication should not condition the effect of 
candidate considerations. All voters, regardless of their political sophistication, have 
well‐developed and accessible “personality schemata” – knowledge gained from a 
lifetime of experience interacting with, observing, and evaluating those around them – 
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that facilitate the reception and use of information related to others’ personalities. Indeed, 
social psychologists have found that people perceive personality traits “automatically,” 
meaning without having to think much at all, upon encountering even the slightest bit of 
information about others (McCulloch et al. 2007). 
Such “automaticity” (Bargh and Chartrand 1999) in person perception means that 
voters should be more or less equally likely to have assessments of candidates’ images 
and thus equally able to use them in subsequent electoral evaluations of candidates. In 
this light, we should not be surprised that candidate considerations are often important 
determinants of voters’ electoral decisions and evaluations. Compared to policy and 
performance, evaluating candidates on the basis of personality is, after all, easy. As such, 
the absolute weight of these considerations should not concern us too much. The cause 
for concern is not that candidate considerations matter at all or even a lot. Rather, it is 
fact that the more substantive bases – like policy and performance – on which voters 
could (and should) evaluate and choose candidates matter so little, leaving candidate 
considerations to dominate electoral decisions almost by default. Candidate 
considerations dominate, and often by extreme degree, simply by virtue of the ease with 
which voters hold them. 
The task, therefore, is to explain variation in the weight of candidate 
considerations relative to the weights of policy and performance considerations.  The 
relative weight of candidate considerations5 depends on the extent to which a voter has 
well‐developed schemata relating to political matters like policy, political actors, 
government actions and so forth. The more developed such schemata, the more voters 
can receive and use political information to form political opinions and evaluate 
candidates. Thus, as political sophistication increases, policy and performance 
                                                
5 The phrase “relative weight of candidate considerations” and variations thereof will refer to the weight of 
these considerations relative to policy and performance considerations henceforth unless stated otherwise. 
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Modeling Electoral Decisions 
I assume that the vote decision results from a process of comparing the voter’s 
electoral utilities for the candidates.   The primary considerations entering into these 
utilities concern policies, performance, and candidates.  The absolute and relative 
weights, I argue, depend on the voter’s political sophistication.  The extent to which a 
voter identifies with a candidate’s political party should also matter, although not in the 
same way.  Controlling for the effect of policy considerations, party identification’s effect 
on candidate utilities should be purely affective, reflecting only emotional attachment to 
the given political party.  I therefore assume its effect to be independent of political 
sophistication. 
Electoral utility and vote choice modeling strategies provide two avenues for 
examining voters’ considerations in electoral decisions.  The former models utilities 
directly.6  The latter models the realized (or, more precisely, reported) vote choice, which 
is informed by voters’ utilities in addition to their strategic calculations.  In line with 
theories of strategic voting behavior, voters may weigh utilities by the (perceived) 
probability that the candidates will win the election before determining for which 
candidate to vote.  Because we typically do not know whether, how, or to what extent 
such strategic calculations change the ways in which utilities correspond to vote choice, 
the vote choice model limits our ability to analyze how voters arrive at their utilities for 
candidates. 
On the other hand, the primary advantage of the vote choice model lies in the 
measurement of the dependent variable.  Unlike utility, vote choice is a realized and, in 
                                                
6 See van der Brug et al. (2003) and van der Eijk et al. (2006) for a discussion of studies that use a similar 
approach. 
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principle, observable outcome, measurable by response to questions asking for whom the 
respondent voted or intends to vote.  In contrast, measurement of electoral utilities is 
much fuzzier.  Utilities are inside-the-head constructs, not directly observable even in 
principle.  I use candidate “feeling thermometer” scores to measure them, on the 
assumption that these scores reflect voters’ overall evaluations of the candidates. 
The utility model makes use of measurement of each voter’s utility for each of the 
candidates.  In the vote choice model, the only thing we know is whether the voter voted 
for each candidate.  All we can say of Brazilians who voted for Lula in 2002, for 
example, is that they did vote for Lula and did not vote for Serra, Garotinho, or Gomes.  
We have no idea of their preference orderings for the other three candidates nor how 
much they liked or disliked any of them.  In the electoral utility model, in contrast, we 
have a measure of each voter’s utility for each of the four candidates.  This is particularly 
appealing in multicandidate elections (van der Eijk et al. 2006) like Brazil’s 2002 
presidential elections. 
I employ both modeling strategies to test my arguments regarding the extent of 
candidate-centered voting and political sophistication.  To the extent that estimation 
results from both models are consistent with one another, we can be all the more 
confident in the substantive conclusions implied therein.  The utility models for each 
election all take the general form of (1) below.  Let  represent the ith voter’s utility for 





where  is the ith voter’s summary evaluation of the jth candidate’s personal 
qualities on various dimensions;  is a summary measure of the extent to which 
the ith voter agrees with the jth candidate on policy issues;  is the ith voter’s 
summary evaluation of the incumbent’s or incumbent party’s performance in office; 
 is a dummy variable indicating whether the ith voter identifies with the jth 
candidate’s political party; and  is the ith voter’s level of political sophistication.7 
As this model suggests, rather than estimate voters’ utilities for individual 
candidates separately, I estimate them all together using a single equation.  Thus, if there 
are n voters and J candidates, the number of observations used to estimate the utility 
model is n x j; the units of observation can be thought of as voter-candidate dyads.  
Model (1) will be estimated using a generalized estimating equations approach.  Note that 
in estimation, I account for the fact that the disturbances for a given voter are likely to be 
correlated across the J candidates, but I assume nonautocorrelation among the 
disturbances across voters. I also assume the disturbances to have constant variance 
across all voters and all candidates. 
The utility model in (1) informs the vote choice counterpart, which runs as 





This can be rewritten more succinctly in matrix notation as: 
 
                                                
7 Note that this model is similar to the models presented in Luskin and Globetti (2002) and Iyenger et al. 





where  is a matrix containing the variables that vary both across voters and across 
candidates (i.e., , , , and the products of these variables with 
);  is a vector containing the coefficients corresponding to each of these 
candidate-specific variables;  is a matrix containing the voter-specific variables (i.e., 
, , and their product); and  is a matrix with J coefficients 
corresponding to each of these voter-specific variables. 
Given (2b), we can write the following probability model cast in conditional logit 
form.8  Let  be the probability that the ith individual votes for the jth candidate.  Then 




where, for the purpose of estimation, one candidate (j = 1) serves as the reference or base 
category and only J – 1 coefficients are estimated in the coefficient vectors of the  
matrix, with the elements corresponding to j = 1 normalized to 0.  This probability 
equation is the basis for the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) used to produce 
estimates of the coefficients.9 
                                                
8 Ideally, one would use a probit specification instead of logit; probit is probably more appropriate given its 
relaxation of IIA assumption.  Attempts to use probit were unsuccessful, however; as is often the case with 
probit models, convergence was not achieved, making estimation impossible.  That being said, the results 
between the probit and logit should not be too different.  Also note that what I call “conditional logit” is 
sometimes referred to as “mixed logit” because it allows for a combination of individual-specific and 
alternative-specific variables. 
9 using the following log likelihood equation: , where  if the ith individual votes for 
the jth candidate. 
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Measurement and Expectations 
The data employed to estimate these models come from Baker et al.’s (2006) 
2002 panel study of eligible Brazilian voters.10  The dependent variables are utilities for 
and vote choice from among the top four vote-getters in the first round vote.  This 
includes Lula (winning 46.4%), Serra (23.2%), Garotinho (17.9%), and Gomes (12%), 
who together won over 99% of the total first round vote.  Utilities are measured with 
responses to “feeling thermometer” items in which respondents are asked to indicate how 
much they like each candidate on a scale from 0 to 10. 
Vote choice is measured with responses to a question asking respondents for 
whom they would cast their vote if elections were held the day of the interview.  The 
reported vote proportions for each candidate in the sample correspond well to actual 
election results: 56.9% for Lula, 23.4% for Serra, 8.5% for Gomes, and 11.2% for 
Garotinho.  Lula serves as the base category (j = 1) for the purposes of estimating the 
effects of the individual-specific variables (i.e., economic retrospective evaluations and 
political sophistication) in the vote choice model. 
I measure voters’ summary evaluations of the candidates’ personal qualities, 
, by averaging the extent to which a given voter perceives a candidate to be 
“honest,” “compassionate,” “decisive,” and “intelligent.”  There are four possible 
response options for these items; for example, respondents could indicate that Lula was 
“not intelligent (0),” “a little intelligent (1),” “intelligent (2),” or “very intelligent (3).”  
To avoid losing too many observations, if a respondent gave a substantive answer (i.e., 
not “don’t know” or no response at all) for at least three of these four trait items, they 
were retained in the sample with their mean trait evaluations adjusted accordingly.  These 
                                                
10 This a six-wave survey panel study conducted in Caxias do Sul and Juiz de Fora.  Nearly all the data 
employed here are drawn from the study’s third wave, conducted in October 2002 between the first and 
second election rounds (i.e., between October 6 – 27, 2002). 
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averages were then divided by 3 to keep the values of  between 0 and 1.  These 
trait evaluations should have a positive influence on the utility and probability of voting 
for a given candidate; as  increases, so too should the voter’s utility and 
probability of voting for that candidate. 
Measures of voters’ summary policy agreement with the candidates, , 
are based on answers to questions asking respondents to place themselves and the 
candidates on three scales relating to land reform, social spending, and privatization. 
These are all of the issue areas in which respondents were asked to place both themselves 
and the candidates.  For each of these issue areas, respondents were asked to indicate 
their position on a given policy from five response options ranging, in ideological terms, 
from the most “left” position (0) to the most “right” position (4).  If  is the ith 
respondent’s position on the kth issue, and  is the jth candidate’s position on that issue, 




where  is the number of issues for which the ith respondent gives substantive answers 
regarding their own position (i.e., not “don’t know” or no response).  To avoid losing too 
many cases due to missing values, respondents are included so long as .11  The 
candidates’ issue positions, , are “objective” measures, measured by the sample 
                                                
11 It is precisely for this reason that I use “mean” Euclidean dist\ance rather than the more straightforward 
and common simple Euclidean distance (or quadratic distance measure).  Because  is not constant across 
respondents, we must rescale the measure (which I do by weighting the Euclidean distance by  ) to be 
comparable across all respondents.  Note that Luskin and Globetti (2002) follow a similar measurement 
strategy. 
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mean placement of the jth candidate on the kth issue.  The mean Euclidean distance across 
the three (or two) issue areas (i.e., in the numerator above) is divided by 4 to keep the 
values of  between 0 and 1.  And the resulting quantity is then multiplied by -1 
so that increasing values represent increasing policy agreement or proximity (rather than 
distance).  Policy agreement should have a positive effect; as  increases, one’s 
utility of voting for that candidate and the probability that they will vote for him should 
also increase. 
Evaluations of the incumbent party’s performance, , are measured by 
voters’ retrospective evaluations about the national economy.  Specifically, respondents 
were asked whether the national economic situation had “worsened a lot (0),” “worsened 
a little (1),” “stayed the same (2),” “improved a little (3),” or “improved a lot (4)” over 
the past twelve months.  Responses were divided by 4 to make ’s values run 
from 0 to 1.  This measure should tap into the extent to which the voter views President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration to have performed well in office. 
Since this variable is individual-specific (varying across voters, but not across 
candidates), its effect is allowed to (but not restricted to) affect the utilities and 
probability of voting for the candidates in different ways.  We should expect retrospective 
evaluations to have the greatest effect for Serra, the candidate representing the incumbent 
president’s party, Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB).  The effect of these 
evaluations should be positive for Serra; as performance evaluations of Cardoso increase, 
so too should the utility of voting for Serra and the probability of voting for Serra over 
Lula (the base or reference category in the choice model).  While these evaluations 
should not have any impact on the probability of voting for Gomes or Garotinho over 
Lula (in terms of the vote choice model), it is less clear how they should shape the 
utilities for non-incumbent party candidates.  If they have any effect, they should be 
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negative, indicating that as retrospective evaluations increase, one’s utility of voting for 
the other candidates decreases; of all the non-incumbent party candidates, we might 
expect this effect (should it exist) to be most pronounced for Lula since he was the 
leading opposition candidate. 
Identification with a political party, , is measured by a dummy variable 
indicating whether a given voter identifies with a given candidate’s political party.  While 
it is trending toward stabilization, the Brazilian party system has historically been rather 
unstable, limiting the potential for citizens to develop attachments to political parties.  Of 
all the parties with presidential candidates, the Workers’ Party is the only one with any 
strong foundation in the electorate.  Indeed only about 50% of the sample indicated 
identifying with any political party with about two-thirds of these identifying with the 
Workers’ Party.  Of course, party identification’s effect should be positive; identifying 
with a candidate’s political party should increase one’s utility and probability of voting 
for that candidate. 
Political sophistication, , is based on responses to factual items – 
following Luskin (1987), Zaller (1992), and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993).  For 
respondents that participated in the first three waves of the survey,  is measured 
as the proportion of correct answers given out of nine factual knowledge questions 
relating to domestic politics and leaders (six from the wave 1 instrument, three from 
wave 3’s).  For respondents new to wave 3 of the study,  is measured as the 
proportion of correct answers out of the three factual items included in wave 3.  Being a 
proportion,  naturally runs from 0 to 1. 
I have no expectations regarding political sophistication’s direct effect on the 
dependent variables.  My interest in political sophistication centers on its potential to 
condition the absolute weights – i.e., effect magnitudes – of policy and performance 
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considerations and, thus, the weight of candidate considerations relative to these.  In 
accordance with my argument, we should expect the weight of policy considerations to 
increase as political sophistication increases.  That is, the effect of  should 
become increasingly positive as political sophistication increases. 
We should expect the weight of performance considerations to increase as 
political sophistication increases as well, but this expectation is limited to choices 
involving Serra, the candidate for the incumbent PSDB.  In other words, the effect of 
 should become increasingly positive as political sophistication increases.  
As discussed above, I do not have any strong expectation that these performance 
evaluations should affect the utilities or probabilities of voting for the other candidates.  
Likewise, I have no clear expectations regarding how political sophistication would 
condition these effects should they exist. 
I do not expect political sophistication to condition the absolute weight of 
candidate considerations.  As discussed above, candidate considerations should matter 
more or less equally for voters regardless of level of political sophistication.  What 
should vary is the weight of these considerations relative to the more substantive 
considerations involving policy and performance.  Thus, as political sophistication 
increases, the weight of candidate considerations relative to policy and performance 
should decrease. 
Descriptive statistics pertaining to all the dependent and independent variables 
described here can be found in Appendix A.  Additional descriptive statistics are 





Estimation results for the utility model and vote choice model are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  Before considering the results regarding political 
sophistication’s conditioning effect, it is interesting to note the role of partisanship in 
Brazilians’ electoral decisions.  In Table 1 we see that identifying with a candidate’s 
political party increases one’s utility for the candidate by about 1.8 points on the 0-10 
utility scale.  Likewise, in Table 2 we see that it makes one about 7.8 times more likely to 
vote for the candidate, all else equal.  Thus, while party identification is not as 
widespread among Brazilians as it is in more developed party systems like the U.S. party 
system, its effect on voting behavior appears to be similarly influential. 
Given the interactions of candidate, policy, and performance considerations with 
political sophistication in the models, interpretation of their effects is not straightforward.  
Table 3 presents the estimated effects for each of these on candidate utilities by level of 
political sophistication.  Given the additional non-linearity in the parameters, 
interpretation is even more cumbersome for the vote choice model results.  To ease 
interpretation of these results, I have calculated the change in predicted probabilities of 
voting for the top two candidates, Lula and Serra, as each variable of interest moves from 
its minimum to its maximum.  This information is presented by level of political 
























































The results largely support my argument regarding political sophistication’s 
conditioning role.  The absolute weights of policy and performance considerations appear 
to be increasing functions of political sophistication.  Consider the effects of policy 
agreement.  In the utility model results presented in Table 3, we see that a shift from the 
minimum ( = 0) to the maximum ( = 1) in political sophistication doubles 
the effect of   on electoral utilities.  Moving from the minimum level of policy agreement 
( = -1) to the maximum ( = 0) increases the least sophisticated (but 
otherwise average) voter’s utility for a candidate by about 1.1 points.  This same shift 
increases the most sophisticated (but otherwise average) voter’s utility by about 2.2 
points. 
In Table 4, we see that the effect of  on the probabilities of voting for 
Lula or Serra are more than four times greater for the most sophisticated voters compared 
to the least sophisticated.  For example, least sophisticated voters who disagree 
maximally with Lula on policy (but are otherwise average) have a 37% chance of voting 
for him anyway; if these voters maximally agree with him, this probability increases to 
51%, making the effect of  on the probability of voting for Lula among this 
group of voters about 15%.  This shift in  among the most sophisticated results 
in an effect of about 61%.  The results regarding predicted probabilities for Serra are 
similar: the effect of  is about 9% among the least sophisticated and about 40% 
among the most sophisticated voters. 
The results regarding political sophistication’s conditioning effect on performance 
considerations follow a similar pattern.  In the utility model results in Table 3, we see that 
moving from the most negative ( = 0) to the most positive ( = 1) 
retrospective economic evaluations makes the least sophisticated ( = 0) (but 
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otherwise average) voter’s utility for Serra increase by about 0.9; this same shift increases 
utilities for Serra by about 2.2 among the most politically sophisticated ( = 1).   
From the predicted probabilities for Serra in Table 4, we see that performance 
considerations do not seem to play much of a role at all among the least political 
sophisticated; moving from the most negative ( = 0) to the most positive 
( = 1) retrospective economic evaluations makes increases one’s probability 
of voting for Serra by less than 1%.  In contrast, this shift increases the predicted 
probability of voting for Serra by about 19% among the most politically sophisticated. 
The estimated effects of performance considerations on the utilities and 
probabilities regarding the non-incumbent party candidates are consistent with my prior 
expectations.  While they do not seem to have any effect for Gomes and Garotinho, they 
do seem to matter – if minimally – for Lula, the leading opposition candidate.  
Furthermore, they matter in ways consistent with my argument regarding political 
sophistication.  In Table 3, we see that the estimated effect of economic evaluations on 
Lula utilities is statistically indistinguishable from zero for all but the most politically 
sophisticated.  For these voters, a shift from the most negative to the most positive 
retrospective economic evaluations results in a decrease of about two-thirds of a point on 
the utility scale.  From Table 4, we see that the effect of performance considerations 
increases from about 0.50% for the least sophisticated to about 11% for the most 
sophisticated on the probability of voting for Lula. 
I have argued that political sophistication should not condition the effect of 
candidate considerations.  While the results do not offer strong support for this contention 
at first glance, they are largely consistent with it.  In the utility model, political 
sophistication does appear to condition the weight of candidate considerations contrary to 
my expectations; the more sophisticated tend to assign less weight to trait evaluations 
 28 
than the less politically sophisticated.  This difference between the least and most 
sophisticated voters is statistically significant (i.e., nonzero); it is not, however, very 
substantively significant.  Whereas moving from the minimum trait evaluation 
( = 0) to the maximum ( = 1) tends to increase the least sophisticated 
voters’ utilities for a candidate by about 8.9, it increases the most sophisticated ones’ by 
about 8.3; a difference of about 0.61 on the 0-10 utility scale.  Likewise, the same shifts 
in trait evaluations produced similar changes regardless of level of political sophistication 
in the predicted probabilities based on the vote choice model.  As shown in Table 4, the 
effect on the probability of voting for Lula is about 96% for the least sophisticated and 
about 98% for the most sophisticated.  The effect in the case of Serra is about 89% for the 




Discussion and Conclusion 
It seems, then, that political sophistication conditions voters’ considerations in 
ways consistent with my argument.  First, as political sophistication increases, so too do 
the absolute weights of policy and performance considerations.  Second, political 
sophistication seems to have very little conditioning effect on the absolute weight of 
candidate considerations.   Trait evaluations matter a great deal regardless of level of 
sophistication.  Third, and necessarily, the relative weight of candidate considerations 
decreases as political sophistication increases. 
Tables 5 and 6 shed more light on political sophistication’s effect on the relative 
weight of candidate considerations in the utility and vote choice models, respectively.  
The “relative weight” here is simply the absolute value of the ratio given by dividing the 
effect of  by the effect of  or .  In both tables, it is clear 
that as political sophistication increases, the dominance of candidate considerations 
diminishes.  Consider, for example, the effect of candidate considerations relative to 
policy.  Moving from the least sophisticated to the most sophisticated in the utility model, 
the weight of candidate considerations relative to policy considerations decreases from 
about 8.4 to 3.9.  In the vote choice model, the relative weight decreases from about 6.6 












Table 5: Relative Effects of Candidate Considerations on Candidate Utilities, by 


































Table 6: Relative Effects of Candidate Considerations on Predicted Probabilities, by 









To be sure that these results are not statistical artifacts of the measures I have 
employed, I estimated additional models using alternative measures for policy and 
performance considerations.  The first alternative measure for   is the negative Euclidean 
distance between the ith voter and jth candidate on a five-point “left-right” ideological 
dimension.  The second alternative measure of policy considerations simply takes 
account of whether the voter and candidate were on the same side of the policy issues 
rather than how strongly they agree or disagree.  As an alternative measure for  , I use 
respondents’ feeling thermometer ratings for the incumbent president, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso of the PSDB. 
Despite some differences in the absolute weights of policy and performance 
considerations, the results (not shown here) from estimating the utility and vote choice 
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models with these alternative measures are consistent with those discussed above.  The 
weight of policy considerations increases for all voters when measured in the more 
simple construction and decreases for all when measured in terms of ideology.  When 
measured in terms of feelings toward the incumbent president, performance 
considerations gain more explanatory power.  Importantly, however, candidate 
considerations continue to dominate, and the patterns concerning the extent to which they 
dominate maintain: the weight of candidate considerations relative to policy and 
performance decreases as political sophistication increases. 
I estimated an additional model specification that includes sociodemographic 
variables in addition to the politico-psychological variables.  These include: respondent 
education, income (natural log), and dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
respondent is Catholic.  Again, the absolute weights associated with the various 
considerations change, but the pattern regarding their relative weights as political 
sophistication increases maintains. 
We have seen that the extent candidate-centered voting indeed seems to be a 
function of political sophistication at the individual level.  Voters with higher levels of 
political sophistication give candidate considerations less weight relative to policy and 
performance considerations compared to their less sophisticated counterparts.  This 
pattern is robust across various alternative model and measurement specifications would 
appear to hold even if candidate traits are conceptualized as more global candidate 
evaluations themselves. 
Political sophistication’s conditioning effect should generalize both to Brazilian 
elections beyond 2002 and elections in contexts beyond Brazil.  That is, individual-level 
variation in the extent of candidate-centered voting should be explained (at least in part) 
by voters’ political sophistication any electoral context.  We should, however, expect 
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variation in the aggregate extent of candidate-centered voting across contexts.  Indeed, a 
fruitful topic for future research should involve exploring such variation across countries 
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